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Group-buying websites represented by Groupon.com are very popular in electronic commerce and online
shopping nowadays. They have multiple slots to provide deals with significant discounts to their visitors
every day. The current user traffic allocation mostly relies on human decisions. We study the problem of
automatically allocating the user traffic of a group-buying website to different deals to maximize the total
revenue and refer to it as the Group-buying Allocation Problem (GAP). The key challenge of GAP is how to
handle the tipping point (lower bound) and the purchase limit ( upper bound) of each deal. We formulate
GAP as a knapsack-like problem with variable-sized items and majorization constraints. Our main results
for GAP can be summarized as follows. (1) We first show that for a special case of GAP, in which the lower
bound equals the upper bound for each deal, there is a simple dynamic programming-based algorithm that
can find an optimal allocation in pseudo-polynomial time. (2) The general case of GAP is much more difficult
than the special case. To solve the problem, we first discover several structural properties of the optimal
allocation, and then design a two-layer dynamic programming-based algorithm leveraging those properties.
This algorithm can find an optimal allocation in pseudo-polynomial time. (3) We convert the two-layer dy-
namic programming based algorithm to a fully polynomial time approximation scheme (FPTAS), using the
technique developed in [Ibarra and Kim 1975], combined with some careful modifications of the dynamic
programs. Besides these results, we further investigate some natural generalizations of GAP, and propose
effective algorithms.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: G.2.1 [DISCRETEMATHEMATICS]: Combinatorial algorithms; F.2.1
[Analysis of Algorithms and Problem Complexity]: Numerical Algorithms and Problems
General Terms: Design, Algorithms, Performance
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Group-buying Allocation Problem, Dynamic Programming, Approxima-
tion Algorithms
1. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, group-buying websites are very popular in electronic commerce and online
shopping. They provide users with multiple deals from merchants with significant dis-
counts every day. For each deal, a price after discount, a tipping point (lower bound), a
purchase limit (upper bound), and a deadline are specified. Only when the number of
purchases exceeds the tipping point is the deal on. A deal is closed once its deadline or
purchase limit is reached.
A group-buying website usually show a featured deal at the main position (see Fig-
ure 1(a)) of its webpage, and several other deals at the sidebar positions (see Figure
1(b)). As far as we know, the current practice in the group-buying websites heavily re-
lies on human decisions to lay out those deals: to select one deal as the featured deal
and to rank the other deals at sidebar positions. Once the decisions are made, the al-
location of deals will be fixed and all the visitors from the same location (e.g., Boston)
will see the same set of deals and the same layout of those deals. We call such a strat-
egy fixed allocation. Fixed allocations clearly require a significant amount of human
efforts but may still result in suboptimal allocations of user traffic. For example, it is
not rare that a visitor comes to the website and finds the featured deal has been sold
out. If we can replace this featured deal by another available deal, we can make better
use of the website traffic. That is, if a group-buying website shows different deals to
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(a) Featured deal (b) Sidebar deals
Fig. 1. Example deals from Groupon.com
different visitors automatically, it should be able to get better revenue. We call such a
strategy automatic allocation.
In this paper, we study how to make automatic allocation of deals for a group-buying
website to maximize its revenue. We call such a problem the group-buying Allocation
Problem (GAP), and give it a knapsack-like formulation in Section 1.1. GAP is a diffi-
cult task because of the following two factors.
(1) We need to display multiple deals, one at each slot, for one visitor, and one deal
cannot be shown at more than one slots for one visitor. The seemingly naive con-
straints combined with the fact that different slot positions have different con-
version biases directly translate to the majorization constraints (see Section 1.2)
which are challenging to deal with.
(2) Each deal has both a tipping point and a purchase limit. To make money from one
deal, the group-buying website must ensure the deal achieves the tipping point.
This corresponds to a lower bound constraint if we decide to allocate some traffic to
a particular deal. To maximize revenue, the group-buying website needs to ensure
the traffic allocated to a deal will not go beyond its purchase limit. This corresponds
to an upper bound constraint.
Now, we introduce the group-buying allocation problem (GAP) and give it a
knapsack-like formulation.
1.1. Group-buying Allocation Problem
Suppose that a GS website has M candidate deals for a given period (e.g., the coming
week) and N website visitors during the time period. Here, for simplicity, we make
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two assumptions: (1) the number of visitors can be forecasted and is known to the GS
website;1 and (2) all the deals arrive at the same time and have the same deadline.2
For an individual deal i, the following information is known to the GS website for
allocation.
— The original price wi describes the price of the item without the discount associated
with the deal.
— The discount di can be specified in terms of a percentage of the original price. A
visitor of the website can purchase the deal with price widi.
— The tipping point Li describes the minimum number of purchases that users are
required to make in order for the discount of the deal to be invoked; otherwise, the
deal fails and no one can get the deal and the discount.
— The purchase limit Ui denotes the maximal service capability of a merchant, and at
most ui visitors can purchase this deal. For example, a restaurant can serve at most
200 customers during the lunch time.
— si is the percentage of revenue share that the GS website can get from each transac-
tion. That is, for each purchase of the deal, the revenue of the GS website is widisi.
For example, Groupon.com usually gets 30%-50% from each transaction. Note that
the GS website can get the revenue from a deal i only if it is on (i.e., at least Li
purchases are achieved).
— λi is the conversion probability for the i-th deal (i.e., the likelihood that a website
visitor will purchase this deal). We assume that λi is known to the GS website in
advance for simplicity.3
Suppose that the GS website shows K deals at K slots to each website visitor. With-
out loss of generality, we assume that the i-th slot is better than the j-th slot if i < j.
For example, the first slot is used to show the featured deal; the second slot corresponds
to the first position at the sidebar; the third slot corresponds to the second position at
the sidebar, so on and so forth. We use γk to denote the conversion bias carried by
each position. Similar to the position bias of click probability in search advertising
[Edelman et al. 2005; Aggarwal et al. 2006], we have that
1 ≥ γ1 > γ2 > ... > γK ≥ 0.
We use Nk to indicate the number of effective impressions for slot position k:
Nk = Nγk.
We have N1 > N2 > · · · > NK . For simplicity and without much loss of accuracy, we
assume that Nk is an integer. We can think an effective impression as an group-buying
deal that actually catches some user’s attention. Note here we assume that the number
of purchase of deal i is the effective impressions allocated to deal i times the conversion
probability λi. Let pi denote the expected revenue that the GS website can get from one
effective impression of the i-th deal if the deal is on:
pi = widisiλi. (1)
We use an integer vector x to denote an allocation, where the i-th element xi de-
notes the number of effective impressions allocated to the i-th deal. For any vector
x = {x1,x2, . . . ,xn}, let x[1] ≥ x[2] ≥ . . .x[n] denotes the components of x in nonincreas-
ing order (ties are broken in an arbitrary but fixed manner). Since there are multiple
1It is an important issue to make accurate forecast of future user traffic, but it is not within the scope of this
paper.
2We leave the case of deals with different arriving times and deadlines to the future work.
3It is actually a separate line of research how to predict this conversion probability [Wu and Bolivar 2009;
Yuan et al. 2011]. We do not consider it in this paper.
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candidate deals and multiple slots, we need to ensure the feasibility of an allocation.
An allocation x is feasible if it satisfies that:
(1) no more than one deal is assigned to a slot for any visitor, and
(2) no deal is assigned to more than one slot for any visitor.
We can easily see that the above constraints are essentially the same in preemptive
scheduling of independent tasks on uniform machines. Consider M jobs with process-
ing requirement xi(i = 1, . . . ,M) to be processed on K parallel uniform machines with
different speeds Nj(j = 1, . . . ,K). Execution of job i on machine j requires xi/Nj time
units. x is a feasible allocation if and only if the minimum makespan of the preemptive
scheduling problem is smaller or equal to 1. According to [Brucker 2007], the sufficient
and necessary conditions for processing all jobs in the interval [0,1] are∑M
j=1 x[j]∑K
j=1Nj
≤ 1, (2)
and ∑i
j=1 x[j]∑i
j=1Nj
≤ 1 , for all i ≤ K. (3)
Thus, a vector x is a feasible allocation for GAP if it satisfies the inequalities in Eqn. (2)
and (3).
1.2. Problem Formulation
Based on the above notations, finding an optimal allocation means solving the follow-
ing optimization problem.
max
x
M∑
i=1
pixi
s.t.
Li
λi
≤ xi ≤ Ui
λi
or xi = 0, for i = 1, 2, ...M
x is a feasible allocation.
Note that x is a vector of integers throughout this paper, and we do not explicitly add
it as a constraint when the context is clear. The first set of constraints says the actual
number of purchase for deal i, which is λixi, should be between the lower bound Li and
upper bound Ui. For simplicity, we denote li = Liλi and ui =
Ui
λi
in the following sections.
Further, we note that the feasibility conditions in Eqn. (2) and (3) can be exactly
described by the majorization constraints.
Definition 1.1. Majorization constraints
The vector x is majorized 4 by vector y (denoted as x  y) if the sum of the largest i
entries in x is no larger than the sum of the largest i entries in y for all i, i.e.,
i∑
j=1
x[j] ≤
i∑
j=1
y[j]. (4)
4 In fact, the most rigorous term used here should be “sub-majorize” in mathematics and theoretical com-
puter science literature (see e.g., [Nielsen 2002; Goel and Meyerson 2006]). Without causing any confusion,
we omit the prefix for simplicity.
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In the above definition, x and y should contain the same number of elements. In
Eqn. (2) and (3), N has less elements than x; one can simply add M − K zeros into
N (i.e., N[i] = 0,∀K < i ≤M ).
Now we are ready to abstract GAP as an combinatorial optimization problem as the
following.
Definition 1.2. Problem formulation for GAP
There are M class of items, C1, . . . ,CM . Each class Ci is associated with a lower bound
li ∈ Z+ and upper bound ui ∈ Z+. Each item of Ci has a profit pi. We are also given a
vector N = {N1, N2, . . . , NK}, called the target vector, where N1 > N2 > · · · > NK . We
use |N| to denote ∑Ki=1Nj . Our goal is to choose xi items from class Ci for each i ∈ [M ]
such that the following three properties hold:
(1) Either xi = 0 (we do not choose any item of class Ci at all) or li ≤ xi ≤ ui (the
number of items of class Ci must satisfy both the lower and upper bounds);
(2) The vector x = {xi}i is majorized by the target vector N (i.e., x  N);
(3) The total profit of chosen items is maximized.
Our results : Our major results for GAP can be summarized as follows.
1. (Section 3) As a warmup, we start with a special case of the GAP problem: the lower
bound of each class of items equals the upper bound. In this case, we can order
the classes by decreasing lower bounds and the order enables us to design a na-
ture dynamic programming-based algorithm which can find an optimal allocation in
pseudo-polynomial running time.
2. (Section 4) We then consider the general case of the GAP problem where the lower
bound can be smaller than the upper bound. The general case is considerably more
difficult than the simple case in that there is no natural order to process the classes.
Hence, it is not clear how to extend the previous dynamic program to the general
case. To handle this difficulty, we discover several useful structural properties of
the optimal allocation. In particular, we can show that the optimal allocation can
be decomposed into multiple blocks, each of them has at most one fractional class
(the number of allocated items for the class is less than the upper bound and larger
than the lower bound). Moreover, in a block, we can determine for each class except
the fractional class, whether the allocated number should be the upper bound or
the lower bound. Hence, within each block, we can reduce the problem to the sim-
pler case where the lower bound of every item equals the upper bound (with slight
modifications). We still need a higher level dynamic program to assemble the blocks
and need to show that no two different blocks use items from the same class. Our
two level dynamic programming-based algorithm can find an optimal allocation in
pseudo-polynomial time.
3. (Section 5) Using the technique developed in [Ibarra and Kim 1975], combined with
some careful modifications, we can further convert the pseudo-polynomial time dy-
namic program to a fully polynomial time approximation scheme (FPTAS). We say
there is an FPTAS for the problem, if for any fixed constant  > 0, we can find a solu-
tion with profit at least (1−)OPT in poly(M,K, log |N|, 1/) time (See e.g., [Vazirani
2004]).
4. (Appendix A) We consider the generalization from the strict decreasing target vector
(i.e., N1 > N2 > · · · > NK) to the non-increasing target vector (i.e., N1 ≥ N2 ≥ . . . ≥
NK), and briefly describe a pseudo-polynomial time dynamic programming-based
algorithm for this setting based on the algorithm in Section 4.
5. (Appendix B) For theoretical completeness, we consider for a generalization of GAP
where the target vector N = {N1, . . . , NK}may be non-monotone. We provide a 12 − 
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factor approximation algorithm for any constant  > 0. In this algorithm, we use
somewhat different techniques to handle the majorization constraints, which may
be useful in other variants of GAP.
2. RELATED WORK
2.1. Studies about Group-buying
[Byers et al. 2012b] studies how daily deal sites affecting the reputation of a business
using evidences from Yelp reviews. It shows that (1) daily deal sites benefit from signif-
icant word-of-mouth effects during sales events, and (2) while the number of reviews
increases significantly due to daily-deal promotions, average rating scores from re-
viewers who mention daily deals are 10% lower than scores of their peers on average.
Further, [Byers et al. 2012a] investigates hypotheses such as whether group-buying
subscribers are more critical than their peers, whether group-buying users are exper-
imenting with services and merchants outside their usual sphere, or whether some
fraction of group-buying merchants provide significantly worse service to customers
using group coupons.
[Dholakia 2011] tries to answer the the question whether group-buying deals would
be profitable for businesses. It shows that because of their many alluring features
and the large volume of subscribers (site visitors), group-buying promotions offer a
potentially compelling business model, and suggests that for longer-term success and
sustainability, this industry will likely have to design promotions that better align the
deals offered to end consumers with the benefits accruing to the merchants. [Edelman
et al. 2011] finds that offering vouchers is more profitable for merchants which are
patient or relatively unknown, and for merchants with low marginal costs.
There are several papers studying consumer purchase/repurchase behaviors to-
wards group-buying deals. Using the dataset of Groupon.com and Yelp.com, [Zhao et al.
2012] finds that, although price promotions offer opportunities for consumers to try
new products with a relatively low cost, online word-of-mouth (WOM) still has a sig-
nificant impact on product sales. [Lvovskaya et al. 2012] demonstrates that consumers
consider price as the main contributing factor for a repurchase at a local business, af-
ter having redeemed a discount coupon. [Song et al. 2012] finds evidence that social
shopping features deter inexperienced shoppers from buying deals early on.
Another weakly related work is [Grabchak et al. 2011]. Although titled as “Groupon
style”, it actually studies the allocation problem for display advertising but not group-
buying services. It formulates the allocation for display advertising as the multi-armed
bandit problem, and proposes several greedy policies which can achieve 1/3- or 1/4-
approximation bounds.
It is easy to see that the focuses of existing works are very different from ours. We
stand on the position of a group-buying website and focus on the problem of revenue
maximization by means of designing smart allocation algorithms.
2.2. Relation to Scheduling and Knapsack Problems
GAP bears some similarity with the classic parallel machine scheduling problems
[Pinedo 2008]. The K slots can be viewed as K parallel machines with different speeds
(commonly termed as the uniformly related machines, see, e.g., [Ebenlendr and Sgall
2004; Horvath et al. 1977]). The M deals can be viewed as M jobs. Since a deal can
be shown at different slots for different visitors, this means the scheduling can be pre-
emptive using the language of scheduling [Horvath et al. 1977; Lawler and Labetoulle
1978; Gonzalez and Sahni 1978].
One major difference between GAP and the scheduling problems lies in the objec-
tive functions. Most scheduling problems target to minimize some functions related
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to time given the constraint of finishing all the jobs, such as makespan minimization
[Ghirardi and Potts 2005], total completion time minimization [Kuo and Yang 2006],
total weighted completion time minimization [Schulz 1996], and total weighted flow
time minimization [Azizoglu and Kirca 1999; Bansal 2003]. In contrast, our objective
is to maximize the revenue generated from the finished jobs (deals in our problem)
given the constraint of limited time. This is similar to the classic knapsack problem
in which we want to maximize the total profit of the items that can be packed in a
knapsack with a known capacity. In fact, our FPTAS in Section 5 borrows the tech-
nique from [Ibarra and Kim 1975] for the knapsack problem. Our work is also related
to the interval scheduling problem [Lipton 1994; Epstein, Jez, Sgall, and van Stee
Epstein et al.] in which the goal is to schedule a subset of interval (preemptively or
non-preemptively) such that the total profit is maximized. GAP differs from this prob-
lem in that the intervals (we can think each deal as an interval) may have variable
sizes.
3. WARMUP: A SPECIAL CASE
In this section, we investigate a special case of GAP, in which li = ui for every class.
In other words, we either select a fixed number (xi = li) of items from class Ci, or
nothing from the class. We present an algorithm that can find the optimal allocation
in poly(M,K, |N|) time based on dynamic programming.
For simplicity, we assume that the M classes are indexed by the descending order of
li in this section. That is, we have l1 ≥ l2 ≥ l3 ≥ · · · ≥ lM .
Let G(i, j, k) denote the maximal profit by selecting at most i items from extactly
k of the first j classes, which can be expressed by the following integer optimization
problem.
G(i, j, k) = max
x
j∑
t=1
ptxt
subject to xt = lt or xt = 0, for 1 ≤ t ≤ j (5)
r∑
t=1
x[t] ≤
r∑
t=1
Nt, for r = 1, 2, ...,min {j,K} (6)
j∑
t=1
x[t] ≤ i (7)
x[k] > 0, x[k+1] = 0 (8)
In the above formulation, x = {x1,x2, ...,xj} is a j dimensional allocation vector. x[t]
is the t-th largest element of vector x. Eqn. (6) restates the majorization constraints.
Eqn. (7) ensures that at most i items are selected and Eqn. (8) indicates that exactly k
classes of items are selected. Further, we use Z(i, j, k) to denote the optimal allocation
vector of the above problem (a j-dimensional vector).
It is easy to see that the optimal profit of the special case is max1≤k≤K G(|N|,M, k).
In the following, we present an algorithm to compute the values of G(i, j, k) for all
i, j, k.
The Dynamic Program : Initially, we have the base cases that G(i, j, k) = 0 if i, j, k
all equal zero. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ |N|, 1 ≤ j ≤M, 1 ≤ k ≤ j, the recursion of the dynamic
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program for G(i, j, k) is as follows.
G(i, j, k) =
max
{
G(i, j − 1, k), if j > 0 (A)
G(i− 1, j, k), if i > 0 (B)
G(i− lj , j − 1, k − 1) + ljpj , if Z(i− lj , j − 1, k − 1) ∪ lj is feasible (C)
(9)
Note that for the case (C) of the above recursion, we need to check whether adding the
j-th class in the optimal allocation vector Z(i− lj , j−1, k−1) is feasible, i.e., satisfying
the majorization constraints in Eqn. (6). The allocation vector Z(i, j, k) can be easily
determined from the recursion as follows.
• If the maximum is achieved at case (A), we have Z(i, j, k)t = Z(i, j − 1, k)t,∀1 ≤ t ≤
j − 1, and Z(i, j, k)j = 0.
• If the maximum is achieved at case (B), we have Z(i, j, k)t = Z(i−1, j, k)t,∀1 ≤ t ≤ j.
• If the maximum is achieved at case (C), we have Z(i, j, k)t = Z(i−lj , j−1, k−1)t,∀1 ≤
t ≤ j − 1, and Z(i, j, k)j = lj .
According to Eqn. (9), all G(i, j, k) (and thus Z(i, j, k)) can be computed in the time5 of
O(M2|N|).
At the end of this section, we remark that the correctness of the dynamic program
crucially relies on the fact that ui = li for all Ci and we can process the classes in
descending order of their lis. However, in the general case where ui 6= li, we do not
have such a natural order to process the classes and the current dynamic program
does not work any more.
4. THE EXACT ALGORITHM FOR GAP
In this section, we consider the general case of GAP (li ≤ ui) and present an algo-
rithm that can find the optimal allocation in poly(M,K, |N|) time based on dynamic
programming. Even though the recursion of our dynamic program appears to be fairly
simple, its correctness relies on several nontrivial structural properties of the optimal
allocation of GAP. We first present these properties in Section 4.1. Then we show the
dynamic program in Section 4.2 and prove its correctness.
4.1. The Structure of the Optimal Solution
Before describing the structure of the optimal solution, we first define some notations.
For simplicity of description, we assume all pis are distinct 6 and the M classes are
indexed in the descending order of pi. That is, we have that p1 > p2 > · · · > pM . Note
that the order of classes in this section is different from that in Section 3.
For any allocation vector x, xi indicates the number of items selected from class i,
and x[i] indicates the i-th largest element in vector x. For ease of notions, when we
say “class x[i]”, we actually refer to the class corresponding to x[i]. In a similar spirit,
we slightly abuse the notation p[i] to denote the per-item profit of the class x[i]. For
example, p[1] is the per-item profit of the class for which we allocate the most number
of items in x (rather than the largest profit). Note that if x[i] = x[i+1], then we put the
class with the larger per-item profit before the one with the smaller per-item profit. In
other words, if x[i] = x[i+1], then we have p[i] > p[i+1].
5One can further decrease the complexity of computing all the G(i, j, k)’s to O(M |N|min(M,K)) by using
another recursion equation. We use the recursion equation as shown in Eqn. (9) considering its simplicity
for presentation and understanding.
6 This is without loss of generality. If pi = pj for some i 6= j, we can break tie by adding an infinitesimal
value to pi, which would not affect the optimality of our algorithm in any way.
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In an allocation x, we call class Ci (or xi) addable (w.r.t. x) if xi < ui. Similarly, class
Ci (or xi) is deductible (w.r.t. x) if xi > li. A class Ci is fractional if it is both addable
and deductible (i.e., li < xi < ui).
Let x? be the optimal allocation vector. We start with a simple yet very useful lemma.
LEMMA 4.1. If a deductible class Ci and an addable class Cj satisfy x?i > x?j in the
optimal solution x?, we must have pi > pj (otherwise, we can get a better solution by
setting x?i = x?i − 1 and x?j = x?j + 1).
The proof of lemma is quite straightforward.
The following definition plays an essential role in this section.
Definition 4.2. (Breaking Points and Tight Segments) Let the set of breaking points
for the optimal allocation x? be
P = {t |
t∑
i=1
x?[i] =
t∑
i=1
Ni} = {t1 < t2 < . . . < t|P |}.
To simplify the notations for the boundary cases, we let t0 = 0 and t|P |+1 =
K. We can partition x? into |P | + 1 tight segments, S1, . . . , S|P |+1, where Si =
{x?[ti−1+1],x?[ti−1+2], . . . ,x?[ti]}. We call S|P |+1 the tail segment, and S1, . . . , S|P | non-tail
tight segments.
We have the following useful property about the number of items for each class in a
non-tail tight segment.
LEMMA 4.3. Given a non-tail tight segment Sk = {x?[tk−1+1],x?[tk−1+2], . . . ,x?[tk]}
which spans Ntk−1+1, . . . , Ntk . For each class Ci that appears in Sk we must have
Ntk−1+1 ≥ x?i ≥ Ntk .
PROOF. From the definition
∑tk
i=1 x
?
[i] =
∑tk
i=1Ni and majorization constraint∑tk−1
i=1 x
?
[i] ≤
∑tk−1
i=1 Ni we know that x
?
[tk]
≥ Ntk . As x?[tk] is the smallest in Sk, we proved
x?i ≥ Ntk . Similarly form
∑tk−1
i=1 x
?
[i] =
∑tk−1
i=1 Ni and
∑tk−1+1
i=1 x
?
[i] ≤
∑tk−1+1
i=1 Ni we know
that Ntk−1+1 ≥ x?[tk−1+1]. As x?[tk−1+1] is the biggest in Sk, we proved Ntk−1+1 ≥ x?i .
Note that as we manually set t|B|+1 = K, the tail segment actually may not be tight.
But we still have Ntk−1+1 ≥ x?i .
Let us observe some simple facts about a tight segment Sk. First, there is at most
one fractional class. Otherwise, we can get a better allocation by selecting one more
item from the most profitable fractional class and removing one item from the least
profitable fractional class. Second, in segment Sk, if Ci is deductible and Cj is addable,
we must have pi > pj (or equivalently i < j) . Suppose Cα(Sk) is the per-item least
profitable deductible class in Sk and Cβ(Sk) is the per-item most profitable addable
class in Sk. From the above discussion, we know α(Sk) ≤ β(Sk). If α(Sk) = β(Sk),
then α(Sk) is the only fractional class in Sk. If there is no deductible class in Sk, we
let α(Sk) = 1. Similarly, if there is no addable class in Sk, we let β(Sk) = M . Let us
summarize the properties of tight segments in the lemma below.
LEMMA 4.4. Consider a particular tight segment Sk of the optimal allocation x?.
The following properties hold.
(1) There is at most one fractional class.
(2) For each class Ci that appears in Sk with i < β(Sk), we must have x?i = ui.
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(3) For each class Ci that appears in Sk with i > α(Sk), we must have x?i = li.
Now, we perform the following greedy procedure to produce a coarser partition of x?
into disjoint blocks, B1, B2, . . . , Bh, where each block is the union of several consecutive
tight segments. The purpose of this procedure here is to endow one more nice property
to the blocks. We overload the definition of α(Bi) (β(Bi) resp.) to denote the index of
the per-item least (most resp.) profitable deductible (addable resp.) class in Bi. We
start with B1 = {S1}. So, α(B1) = α(S1) and β(B1) = β(S1). Next we consider S2. If
[α(B1), β(B1)] intersects with [α(S2), β(S2)], we let B1 ← B1 ∪ S2. Otherwise, we are
done with B1 and start to create B2 by letting B2 = S2. Generally, in the i-th step,
suppose we are in the process of creating block Bj and proceed to Si. If [α(Bj), β(Bj)]
intersects with [α(Si), β(Si)], we let Bj ← Bj ∪ Si. Note that the new [α(Bj), β(Bj)] is
the intersection of old [α(Bj), β(Bj)] and [α(Si), β(Si)]. Otherwise, we finish creating
Bj and let the initial value of Bj+1 be Si.
We list the useful properties in the following critical lemma. We can see that Prop-
erty (2) is new (compared with Lemma 4.4).
LEMMA 4.5. Suppose B1, . . . , Bh are the blocks created according to the above pro-
cedure from the optimal allocation x?, and α(Bi) and β(Bi) are defined as above. The
following properties hold.
(1) Each block has at most one fractional class.
(2) α(B1) ≤ β(B1) < α(B2) ≤ β(B2) < . . . < α(Bh) ≤ β(Bh).
(3) For each class Ci that appears in any blockBk with i < β(Bk), we must have x?i = ui.
(4) For each class Ci that appears in any block Bk with i > α(Bk), we must have x?i = li.
PROOF. Consider block Bk = Si ∪ Si+1 ∪ . . . ∪ Sj . It is easy to see from the above
procedure that [α(Bk), β(Bk)] =
⋂j
t=i[α(St), β(St)]. If there are two different fractional
class (they must from different Sts), we have [α(Bk), β(Bk)] = ∅, contradicting the
procedure for creating Bk. This proves (1).
Now, we prove (2). Let us first consider two adjacent tight segments Si−1 and Si. By
Lemma 4.1, we have pα(Si−1) > pβ(Si) (or equivalently, α(Si−1) < β(Si)). Suppose we
are in the ith step when we are creating block Bj . We can see that α(Bj) > β(Sk) for
all k ≥ i. This is because α(Bj) is equal to α(Sk′) for some k′ < i. Consider block Bj+1.
We know it consists of several tight segments Sk with k ≥ i. So, β(Bj+1) is equal to
β(Sk) for some k ≥ i, which is less than α(Bj). Moreover, since intervals [α(Bj), β(Bj)]
are disjoint, we complete the proof of (2).
Properties (3) and (4) are essentially inherited from Lemma 4.4.
4.2. The Dynamic Program
Our algorithm for GAP has two levels, both based on dynamic programming. In the
lower level, we attempt to find the optimal allocation for each block. Then in the higher
level, we assemble multiple blocks together to form a global optimal solution. Lastly,
we prove the optimal allocations for these individual blocks do not use one class of
items multiple times, thus can be assembled together.
The Lower Level Dynamic Program : Let us first describe the lower level dynamic
program. Denote F (i, j, k),∀1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ K, 1 ≤ k ≤M as the maximal profit generating
from the block B which spans Ni, Ni+1, . . . , Nj and α(B) ≤ k ≤ β(B). Note here the
block B is not one of the blocks created from the optimal allocation x?, but we still
require that it satisfies the properties described in Lemma 4.5. More formally, F (i, j, k)
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can be written as an integer program in the following form:
F (i, j, k) = max
M∑
t=1
ptxt
subject to xt = ut or xt = 0, for t < k (10)
xt = lt or xt = 0, for t > k (11)
lt ≤ xt ≤ ut or xt = 0, for t = k (12)
r∑
t=1
x[t] ≤
i+r−1∑
t=i
Nt, for r = 1, 2, ...j − i (13)
j−i+1∑
t=1
x[t] =
j∑
t=i
Nt (14)
x[j−i+2] = 0. (15)
Constraints (10) and (11) correspond to Properties (3) and (4) in Lemma 4.5. The con-
straint (12) says Ck may be the only fractional constraint. The constraints (13) are the
majorization constraints. Constraints (14) and (15) say B spans Ni, . . . , Nj with exactly
j − i + 1 class of items. If j = K (i.e., it is the last block), we do not have the last two
constraints since we may not have to fill all slots, or with fixed number of classes.
To compute the value of F (i, j, k), we can leverage the dynamic program developed
in Section 3. The catch is that for any xk ∈ [lk, uk], according to Eqn. (10) and (11), xi
can only take 0 or a non-zero value (either ui or li). This is the same as making ui = li.
Therefore, for a given xk ∈ [lk, uk], the optimal profit F (i, j, k), denoted as Fxk(i, j, k),
can be solved by the dynamic program in Section 3.7 Finally, we have
F (i, j, k) = max
xk=0,lk,lk+1,lk+2,··· ,uk
Fxk(i, j, k).
The Higher Level Dynamic Program : We use D(j, k) to denote the optimal alloca-
tion of the following subproblem: if j < K, we have to fill up exactly N1, N2, . . . , Nj (i.e.,∑
i xi =
∑j
i=1Nj) and α(B) ≤ k where B is the last block of the allocation; if j = K,
we only require
∑
i xi ≤
∑j
i=1Nj . Note that we still have the majorization constraints
and want to maximize the profit. The recursion for computing D(j, k) is as follows:
D(j, k) = max
{
max
i<j
{D(i, k − 1) + F (i+ 1, j, k)}, D(j, k − 1)
}
. (16)
We return D(K,M) as the final optimal revenue of GAP.
As we can see from the recursion (16), the final value D(K,M) is a sum of several F
values, say F (1, t1, k1), F (t1 + 1, t2, k2), F (t2 + 1, t3, k3), . . ., where t1 < t2 < t3 < . . . and
k1 < k2 < k3 < . . .. Each such F value corresponds to an optimal allocation of a block.
Now, we answer the most critical question concerning the correctness of the dynamic
program: whether the optimal allocations of the corresponding blocks together form
a global feasible allocation? More specifically, the question is whether one class can
appear in two different blocks? We answer this question negatively in the next lemma.
LEMMA 4.6. Consider the optimal allocations x1 and x2 corresponding to
F (i1, j1, k1) and F (i2, j2, k2) respectively, where i1 ≤ j1 < i2 ≤ j2 and k1 < k2. For
any class Ci, it is impossible that both x1i 6= 0 and x2i 6= 0 are true.
7 The only extra constraint is (14), which is not hard to ensure at all since the dynamic program in Section 3
also keeps track of the number of slots used so far.
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PROOF. We distinguish a few cases. We will use Lemma 4.3 on blocks in the follow-
ing proof.
(1) i ≤ k1. Suppose by contradiction that x1i 6= 0 and x2i 6= 0. We always have x1i ≤ ui.
Since i ≤ k1 < k2, again by Lemma 4.5, we have also x2i = ui. Moreover, from
Lemma 4.3 we know that x1i ≥ Nj1 > Ni2 ≥ x2i . This renders a contradiction.
(2) i ≥ k2. Suppose by contradiction that x1i 6= 0 and x2i 6= 0. By Lemma 4.5, we know
x1i = li and x2i ≥ li. We also have that x1i > Ni2 ≥ x2i due to Lemma 4.3, which gives
a contradiction again.
(3) k1 < i < k2. Suppose by contradiction that x1i 6= 0 and x2i 6= 0. By Lemma 4.5, we
know x1i = li and x2i = ui. We also have the contradiction by x1i > x2i .
We have exhausted all cases and hence the proof is complete.
THEOREM 4.7. The dynamic program (16) computes the optimal revenue for GAP in
time poly(M,K, |N|).
PROOF. By Lemma 4.5, the optimal allocation x? can be decomposed into several
blocks B1, B2, . . . , Bh for some h. Suppose Bk spans Nik−1+1, . . . , Nik . Since the dynamic
program computes the optimal value, we have F (ik−1 + 1, ik, α(Bk)) ≥
∑
i∈Bk pix
?
i .
Moreover, the higher level dynamic program guarantees that
D(K,M) ≥
∑
k
F (ik−1 + 1, ik, α(Bk)) ≥
∑
k
∑
i∈Bk
pix
?
i = OPT .
By Lemma 4.6, our dynamic program returns a feasible allocation. So, it holds that
D(K,M) ≤ OPT . Hence, we have shown that D(K,M) = OPT .
5. A FULL POLYNOMIAL TIME APPROXIMATION SCHEME
The optimal algorithm developed in Section 4 runs in pseudo-polynomial time (since it
is a polynomial of |N|). In this section, we present a full polynomial time approximation
scheme (FPTAS) for GAP. Recall that we say there is an FPTAS for the problem, if for
any fixed constant  > 0, we can find a solution with profit at least (1− )OPT in time
polynomial in the input size (i.e., O(M + K × log |N|)) and 1/. Note that assuming
P 6= NP this is the best possible approximation algorithm we can obtain since GAP is
NP-hard (it is a significant generalization of the NP-hard knapsack problem).
Our FPTAS is based on the 2-level dynamic programs we developed in Section 4.2.
We observe that it is only the lower level dynamic program that runs in pseudo-
polynomial time. So our major effort is to convert this dynamic program into an FPTAS.
As before, we still need to guarantee at the end that the allocations for these block can
be concatenated together to form a global feasible allocation. From now on, we fix the
small constant  > 0.
FPTAS for the Lower Level Problem : We would like to approximate the optimal
allocation of a block (i.e., F (i, j, k)) in polynomial time. Now, we fix i, j and k. Since we
can only get an approximate solution, some properties are lost and we have to modify
the lower level subproblem (LLS) in the following way.
L1. (10) is strengthened to be xt = {0, ut}, for t < k and Ni ≥ ut ≥ Nj ;
L2. (11) is strengthened to be xt = {0, lt} for t > k and Ni ≥ lt ≥ Nj ;
L3. (12) is strengthened to be xk = 0 or (lk ≤ xk ≤ uk and Ni ≥ xk ≥ Nj);
L4. (13) remain the same and (14) is relaxed to
∑j−i+1
t=1 x[i] ≤
∑j
t=iNt.
Let F (i, j, k) to be the optimal revenue allocation subject to the new set of constraints.
From the proof of Lemma 4.6, we can see the modifications of (10) and (11) do not
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change the problem the optimal allocation also satisfies the new constraints. (14) is
relaxed since we can not keep track of all possible total sizes in polynomial time. The
optimal solution of the modified problem is no less than F (i, j, k).
We first assume we know the value of xk. We will get rid of this assumption later.
For ease of description, we need some notations. Let C be the set of classes that may
participate in any allocation of LLS (those satisfy L1 and L2). Let st be the number of
items used in Ct if Ct participates the allocation. In other words, st = ut if st satisfies
L1, st = lt if st satisfies L2, and sk = xk.
Now, we modify the profit of each class. Let F˜ denote the maximal profit by simply
taking one class that satisfies the constraints. It is easy to see that
max
t∈C
ptst ≤ F˜ ≤ F (i, j, k).
For any class Ct with t 6= k, if Ct participates the optimal solution of F (i, j, k), we know
how many items are used (either ut or lt). So, we associate the entire class Ct with a
profit (called modified class profit)
Q˜t = b2Mptst
F˜
c for t ∈ C
The modified profit of Ct can be seen as a scaled and discretized version of the actual
profit of Ct. 8 It is important to note that Q˜t is an integer bounded by O(M/) and the
maximum total modified profit we can allocate is bounded by O(M2/).
Everything is in place to describe the dynamic program. Let H(t, r, Q˜) be the min-
imum total size of any allocation for subproblem F (i, j, k) with the following set of
additional constraints:
(1) We can only use classes from {C1, . . . ,Ct};
(2) Exactly r different classes participate in the allocation;
(3) The total modified profit of the allocation is Q˜;
(4) All constraints of LLS are also satisfied.
Initially, H(t, r, Q˜) = 0 for t, r, Q˜ = 0 and H(t, r, Q˜) =∞ for others. The recursion of the
dynamic program is as follows:
H(t, r, Q˜) = min
 H(t− 1, r, Q˜), If we decide xi = 0;H(t− 1, r − 1, Q˜− Q˜t) + st, If Ct ∈ C and we use Ct and
H(t− 1, r − 1, Q˜− Q˜t) + st ≤ Ni + . . .+Ni+r.
The correctness of the recursion is quite straightforward and we omit its proof. We
return the allocation x corresponding to H(t, r, Q˜) that has a finite value and Q˜ is the
highest. The running time is bounded by O((i− j)×M × M2 ) which is a polynomial.
LEMMA 5.1. Suppose x? is optimal allocation corresponding to F (i, j, k) and we
know the value of x?k. The profit of the allocation x the above dynamic program is at
least (1− )F (i, j, k).
PROOF. We use It and I?t as the Boolean variables indicating whether Ct partici-
pates in the allocations x and x? respectively. Since the dynamic program finds the
8 It is critical for us to use the discretized profit as one dimension of the dynamic program instead of the
discretized size. Otherwise, we may violate the majorization constraints (by a small fraction). Such idea was
also used in the FPTAS for the classic knapsack problem [Ibarra and Kim 1975].
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optimal solution with respect to the modified profit, we have∑
t
ItQ˜t ≥
∑
t
I?t Q˜t.
By the definition of the modified profit, we can see that∑
t
It
(2Mptst
F˜
+ 1
)
≥
∑
t
It
⌊2Mptst
F˜
⌋
≥
∑
t
I?t
⌊2Mptst
F˜
⌋
≥
∑
t
I?t
(2Mptst
F˜
− 1
)
.
Simple manipulation gives us that∑
t
Itptst ≥
∑
t
I?t ptst − 2M
F˜
2M
≥ (1− )F (i, j, k).
In the last inequality, we use F˜ ≤ F (i, j, k). This completes the proof.
Lastly, we briefly sketch how we get rid of the assumption that xk is known (by losing
at most an  fraction of profit). Enumerating all possible xk values is not feasible since
there are O(uk − lk) possibilities in the worst case. To achieve a polynomial running
time, we only try the following set of possible values for xk:
Dk = {0, lk, uk, Ni, Nj}∪{all integers in [lk, uk]∩[Ni, Nj ] with the formb(1+)hc, h ∈ Z+}.
Clearly, the size of Dk is O(log |N|). Moreover, for any possible xk value, we can see
that there is a number in Dk that is at most xk and at least (1 − )xk. Therefore, for
any allocation x, there is an allocation x˜ where x˜k ∈ Dk and the profit of x˜ is at least
1−  times the profit of x.
The Higher Level Problem : The higher level dynamic program is the same as (16),
except that we only use the (1 − )-approximation for F (i, j, k). The correctness of the
overall algorithm follows the same line as before. Since we have enforced constraints
L1, L2 and L3, we can still prove Lemma 4.6 (all arguments in the proof still carry
through). Because we have a (1 − )-approximation for each F (i, j, k) and D(j, k) is a
sum of several such F values, we also have a (1−)-approximation forD(j, k). Moreover,
the running time for solving this dynamic program is bounded by a polynomial. In
summary, we have the following theorem.
THEOREM 5.2. There is an FPTAS for GAP. In other words, for any fixed con-
stant  > 0, we can find a feasible allocation with revenue at least (1 − )OPT in time
poly(M,K, log |N|, 1 ) where OPT is the optimal revenue.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have formulated and studied the group-buying allocation problem: finding an opti-
mal allocation for a group-buying website to maximize its revenue. We have designed
two dynamic programming based algorithms, which can find an optimal allocation in
pseudo-polynomial time. An FPTAS has also been derived based on the proposed algo-
rithms, which can handle instances of larger size. In fact, our preliminary simulation
results show that with a modern PC the algorithm proposed in Section 4 can handle
a reasonable size instance: a group-buying website with ten slots, hundreds of deals
and millions of website visitors. The FPTAS can handle even larger instances: with
tens of slots, hundreds of deals and hundreds of millions of website visitors. We are
conducting more comprehensive experiments and the detailed report is deferred to the
a future version of this work.
There are many research issues related to group-buying allocation which need fur-
ther investigations. (1) We have studied the offline allocation problem and assumed
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that the traffic N of a group-buying website is known in advance and all the deals
are available before allocation. It is interesting to study the online allocation problem
when the traffic is not known in advance and both website visitors and deals arrive
online one by one. (2) We have assumed that the position discount γi of each slot and
conversion rate λi of each deal are given. It is worthwhile to investigate how to max-
imize revenue with unknown position discount and conversion rate. (3) We have not
considered the strategic behaviors of merchants and consumers/visitors. It is of great
interest to study the allocation problem in the setting of auctions.
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A. HANDLING GENERAL NONINCREASING TARGET VECTOR
In this section, we consider the general case where N1 ≥ N2 ≥ . . . ≥ NK and some
inequalities hold with equality. Our previous algorithm does not work here since the
proof of Lemma 4.6 relies on strict inequalities. In the general case, the lemma does
not hold and we can not guarantee that no class is used in more than one blocks. In our
experiment, we also found some concrete instances that make the previous algorithm
fail. In fact, this slight generalization introduces a lot of complications, especially in
the boundary cases. We only briefly sketch some essential changes and omit those
tedious (but not difficult) details.
We distinguish two types of blocks, E-blocks and F-blocks. F-blocks are the same
as the blocks we defined in Section 4 with one additional constraint: Suppose the F-
block spans Ni, . . . , Nj . For any class Ck in this block, xk > Nj if Nj = Nj+1, and
xk < Ni if Ni = Ni−1, To handle the case where there are some consecutive equal N
values, we need E-blocks. An E-block consists of a maximal set of consecutive classes,
say x[i], . . . ,x[j], such that they are of equal size and form the same number of tight
segments. In other words, we have
∑i−1
k=1 x[k] =
∑i−1
k=1Nk and x[i] = x[i+1] = . . . = x[j] =
Ni = . . . = Nj . An E-block differ from an F-block in that a E-block may contain more
than one fractional classes. We can still define α(Ei) and β(Ei) for an E-block Ei. But
this time we may not have α(Ei) ≤ β(Ei) due to the presence of multiple fractional
classes.
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Now, we describe our new dynamic program. Let E(i, j, k1, k2) be the optimal allo-
cation for an E-block that spans Ni, . . . , Nj (Ni = Ni+1 = . . . = Nj) and β(Ei) ≥ k1
and α(Ei) ≤ k2. Computing E(i, j, k1, k2) can be done by a simple greedy algorithm
that processes the classes in decreasing order of their profits. We need to redefine the
higher level dynamic program. D(i, k, F ) represents the optimal allocation for the fol-
lowing subproblem : we have to fill up exactly N1, N2, . . . , Ni (i.e.,
∑
j xj =
∑i
j=1Nj)
and α(B) ≤ k where B is the last block and is an F-block (if i = K, we allow∑
j xj ≤
∑i
j=1Nj). D(i, k, E) represents the optimal allocation of the same subprob-
lem except the last block B is an E-block.
The new recursion is as follows. We first deal with the case where the last block is
an F-block.
D(i, k, F ) = max
j<i,l<k
{
D(j, l, F ) + F (j + 1, i, k)
D(j, l, E) + F (j + 1, i, k)
(17)
The other case is where the last block is an E-block.
D(i, k, E) = max
j<i,l≤k
{
D(j, l, F ) + E(j + 1, i, l + 1, k)
D(j, l, E) + E(j + 1, i, l + 1, k) if Ni 6= Nj (18)
We can show that for two consecutive (F or E) blocks Bk and Bk+1 and in the optimal
allocation, we have α(Bk) < β(Bk+1) (even though we may not have α(Bk) ≤ β(Bk) for
E-blocks). This is why we set the third argument in E(j+1, i, l+1, k) to be l+1. We can
also argue that no two blocks would use items from the same class. The proof is similar
with Lemma 4.6. Moreover, we need to be careful about the boundary cases where α(E)
and β(E) are undefined. In such case, their default values need to be chosen slightly
differently. For clarity, we omit those details.
B. A ( 1
2
− )-APPROXIMATION WHEN N IS NON-MONOTONE
In the section, we provide a 12 −  factor approximation algorithm for a generalization
of GAP where the target vector N = {N1, . . . , NK} may not be monotone (N1 ≥ N2 ≥
. . . ≥ NK may not hold). We still require that
∑r
t=1 x[t] ≤
∑r
t=1Nt for all r. Although
we are not aware of an application scenario that would require the full generality, the
techniques developed here, which are quite different from those in Section 4, may be
useful in handling other variants of GAP or problems with similar constraints. So we
provide this approximation algorithm for theoretical completeness.
Note that our previous algorithms does not work for this generalization. In fact, we
even conjecture that the generalized problem is strongly NP-hard (So it is unlike to
have a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm). Next, we present our algorithm assuming
|N| is polynomially bounded. At the end, we discuss how to remove this assumption
briefly.
We first transform the given instance to a simplified instance. The new instance en-
joys a few extra nice properties which make it more amenable to the dynamic program-
ming technique. In the next section, we present a dynamic program for the simplified
instance that runs in time poly(M,K, |N|) for any fixed constant 0 <  < 13 ( is the
error parameter).
B.1. Some Simplifications of The Instance
Let OPT be the optimal value of the original problem. We make the following sim-
plifications. We first can assume that ui/li ≤ 1/, for every class Ci. Otherwise, we
can replace Ci by a collection of classs Ci1,Ci2, . . . ,Cik where li1 = li, ui1 = li/,
li2 = li/ + 1, ui2 = li/
2, li3 = li/2 + 1, . . ., lik = li/k−1 + 1, uik = ui. In the follow-
ing lemma, we show that the optimal solution of the new instance is at least OPT and
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can be transformed into a feasible solution of the original problem without losing too
much profit.
LEMMA B.1. The optimal allocation of the new instance is at least OPT . Any allo-
cation with cost SOL of the new instance can be transformed into a feasible solution of
the original instance with cost at least ( 12 − )SOL in polynomial time.
PROOF. The first part follows easily from the fact that any feasible allocation of the
original instance is also feasible in the new instance. Now, we prove the second part.
An allocation x for the new instance may be infeasible for the original instance if we
use items from multiple classes out of Ci1, . . . ,Cik. Assume hi = max{j | xij > 0} for
all i. We can obtain a feasible allocation for the original problem by only using items
from Cihi for all i. The loss of profit can be bounded by∑
i
hi−1∑
j=1
uij ≤ 1
1− ui(hi−1) ≤
1
1−  lihi ≤
1
1− xihi .
The profit we can keep is at least
∑
i xihi . This proves the lemma.
For each class Ci, let ti be the largest integer of the form b(1+ )kc that is at most ui.
Let the new upper bound be max(li, ti). We can easily see that after the modification of
ui, the optimal value of the new instance is at least (1− )OPT . Moreover, we have the
following property: For each positive integer T , let M(T ) = {Ci | li ≤ T ≤ ui}. Because
for all Ci ∈ MT , ui is either equal to li (also equal to T ) or in the form of b(1 + )kc, and
ui/li ≤ 1/, we have the following property:
P1. All classes in MT has at most O(log1+ 1 ) = O(1) different upper bounds any any
fixed constant  > 0.
COROLLARY B.2. Assuming |N| is polynomially bounded, a polynomial time exact
algorithm for the simplified instance (satisfying P1) implies a 12 −  for the original
instance for any constant  > 0.
B.2. An Dynamic Program For the Simplified Instance
Now, we present a dynamic program for the simplified instance. Our dynamic program
runs in time poly(M,K, |N|).
We first need to define a few notations. We use N(i, y) to denote the vector
{N1, N2, . . . , Ni−1, Ni + y}
for every k and x. Each N(k, x) will play the role of the target vector for some subin-
stance in the dynamic program. Note that the original target vector N can be writ-
ten as N(n, 0). For each positive integer T , we let MT = {Ci | li ≤ T ≤ ui} and
MtT = {Ci | li ≤ T ≤ ui = t}. Note that MtT are not empty for O(logM) different t
due to P1. Let AtT = {Ci | li = T, ui = t} and BtT = {Ci | li < T, ui = t}. Note that
MT = ∪tMtT and MtT = AtT ∪ BtT . Due to P1, we can see that for a fixed T , there are at
most O(1) different t values such that AtT and BtT are nonempty.
We define a subinstance I(T, {At}t, {Bt}t, k, x) with the following interpretation of
the parameters:
(1) T : We require xi ≤ T for all i in the subinstance.
(2) {At}t, {Bt}t: Both {At} and {Bt} are collections of subsets of classes. Each At ⊂ AtT
(Bt ⊂ BtT resp.) consists of the least profitable |At| classes in AtT (|Bt| classes in
BtT resp.). We require that among all classes in AtT (BtT resp.), only those classes in
At (Bt resp.) may participate in the solution. If Ci participates in the solution, we
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must have li ≤ xi ≤ ui. Basically, {At}, {Bt} capture the subset of classes in MT
that may participates in the solution of the subinstance. Since there are at most
O(1) different t such that AtT and BtT are nonempty, we have at most nO(1) such
different {At}s and {Bt}s (for a fixed T ).
(3) Each class Ci with ui < T may participate in the solution.
(4) k, y: N(k, y) is the target vector for the subinstance.
We use OPT (T, {At}, {Bt}t, k, x) to denote the optimal solution for the subinstance
I(T, {At}, {Bt}t, k, x).
Now, we present the recursions for the dynamic program. In the recursion, suppose
we want to compute the value D(T, {At}, {Bt}, i, x). Let Ca(t) be the Atth least prof-
itable class in AtT and Cb(t) be the Btth least profitable class in BtT . We abuse the
notation {At′ − 1}t to denote the same set as {At}t except that the subset At′ is re-
placed with At′ \ Ca(t) (i.e., the most profitable class in At′ is removed). The value of
D(T, {At}, {Bt}, β, i, y) can be computed as follows:
max
t′
 D(T, {At′ − 1}t, {Bt}t, i− 1, y +Ni − T ) + pa(t)T, if At > 1 ∧ y +Ni − T ≥ 0; (A)D(T, {At}t, {Bt′ − 1}t, i− 1, y +Ni − T ) + pb(t)T, if Bt > 1 ∧ y +Ni − T ≥ 0; (B)D(T − 1, {A′t}t, {B′t}t, i, y), see explanation below; (C)
(A) captures the case that Ca(t) participates in the optimal solution of the subinstance
and xa(t) = T . Similarly, (B) captures the decision xb(t) = T . In case (C), {A′t}t, {B′t}t
are obtained from {At}t, {Bt}t as follows:
(1) For any t ≥ T and |Bt| > 0, let A′t ⊂ Bt be the set of classes with lower bound T − 1
and B′t be Bt \A′t.
(2) We need to include all classes with upper bound T − 1. That is to let A′T−1 = AT−1T−1
and B′T−1 = BT−1T−1.
Note that this construction simply says {A′t} and {B′t} should be consistent with {At}
and {Bt}. (C) captures the case that xi < T for all i ∈ ∪tAtT ∪ BtT . This finishes the
description of the dynamic program. We can see the dynamic program runs in time
poly(M,K, |N|) since there are at most O(|N|2MO(1)) different subinstances and com-
puting the value of each subinstance takes constant time.
Now, we show why this dynamic program computes the optimal value for all
subinstances defined above. In fact, by a careful examination of the dynamic pro-
gram, we can see that it suffices to show the following two facts in subinstance
I(T, {At}, {Bt}, k, y). Recall Ca(t) is the Atth cheapest class in AtT and Cb(t) is the Btth
cheapest class in BtT . Fix some t ≥ T , we have that
(1) Either xi = 0 for all i ∈ AtT or xa(t) = T .
(2) Either xi < T for all i ∈ BtT or xb(t) = T .
For each i ∈ AtT , we can have either xi = 0 or xi = T (since both the lower and upper
bounds are T ). Hence, if some xi is set to be T , it is better to be the most profitable
one in At, i.e., Ca(t). This proves the first fact. To see the second fact, suppose that
xb(t) < T but xj = T for some cheaper Cj ∈ BtT (Bt) (i.e., pj < pb(t)) in some optimal
solution of the subinstance. By increasing xb(t) by 1 and decreasing xj by 1, we obtain
another feasible allocation with a strictly higher profit, contradicting the optimality
of the current solution. Having proved the correctness of the dynamic program, we
summarize our result in this subsection in the following lemma.
LEMMA B.3. There is a polynomial time algorithm for the problem if the given in-
stance satisfies P1.
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Combining Corollary B.2 and Lemma B.3, we obtain the main result in this section.
Our algorithm runs in pseudo-polynomial time. To make the algorithm runs in truly
polynomial time, we can use the technique developed in Section 5 using the modified
profits as one dimension of the dynamic program instead of using the total size. The
profit loss incurred in this step can be bounded by  ·OPT in the same way. The details
are quite similar to those in Section 5 and we omit them here.
THEOREM B.4. For any constant  > 0, there is a factor 12 −  approximation algo-
rithm for GAP even when the target vector N is not monotone.
